CO129-502-7 China- general situation 4-3-1927 - 26-4-1927 — Page 49

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3. The bearing of the above military situation on

the question of sanctions is as follows. The forts and

arsenals on the Yangtse, which had been designated for

destruction as a form of sanction, are likely before

long to fall into the hands of the Northern Chinese.

As the latter did not destroy ther on their evacuation

in retreat they may have had in mind the desirability

of utilising them in the event of their return, and (as

pointed out to the Cabinet by the Chief of the Naval

Staff) would probably be antagonised by their destruction

by the Powers or by ourselves. We have considered the

possible alternative of occupying these positions with a

military force and handing them over intact to the

Northerners in the event of their arrival. This, however,

would involve locking up troops for a period the length

of which cannot be measured, and we therefore decided to

reject this idea. A further objection to any action

against the forts is that they are at present held by

the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, who is now openly defying

the extremist elements in the Southem Government and is

un--

not/likely to deal with the forces from Hunan who

support the extremist party and were responsible for

the outrages at Nanking. Any action taken against the

forts would prove detrimental to Chiang Kai-shek and

tend to antagonise him, which, in the above circumstances,

is obviously undesirable.

In present conditions, therefore, we recommend

that the destruction or occupation of the forts on the

Yangtse and of the arsenal at Hankow should be abandoned

as a measure of sanction, though, if circumstances change,

it might still prove useful.

4. We have also considered the possibility,

mentioned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

at the last Cabinet Meeting, of a re-occupation of the

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